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2Incentive Taxation and Sustainable Growth in the Third World
Abstract
The judicious use of natural resources is a crucial prerequisite for sustainable growth not only in
developed countries, but even more so in the Third World. To a substantial degree, natura
resource use is determined by the tax structure governing a country's economic activity. When
a tax constitution can be designed which stimulates the judicious use of natural resources, an
important step towards achieving sustainable growth has been made. Designing such a constitution
is not a simple task, however. For third world countries, the task i  further complicated by at least
three factors. On the one hand, the tax system has to be exceedingly simple, since both number
and quality of tax instruments available to third world governments tend to be limited. Secondly,
the legal system tends to mirror the state of economic development. This limits not only the tax
structure an economy can bear; it also limits a government's ability to regulate natural resource
use by legal means. Thirdly, the more elaborate a legal system, the more diversity it affords its
country for economic activity, including opportunities for the division of labour. 
The essay has eight sections. It starts with the discussion of the use of the environment and the
natural resource endowment from the point of view of public finance theory. This point of
departure is central, as it serves to identify the net product (l  produit net) of economic activity
after full consideration of the use of natural resources in the process of producti n. Fr m this point
of view, the question of what constitutes spillover effects or externali ies in a market economy can
be seen in the broad public finan e perspective developed in section two. Section three discusses
some standard problems in designing a tax constitution for a third world country. Section four
explores possibilities for creating a framework in which the sustainabl  use of the natural resource
endowment can take place. Central to the sustainable use is the notion that the environment has
to be put to different uses, which raises the issue of the reversal of use dealt with in section five.
The possibilities of ensuring reversibility of the use of natural resources is discussed in section six
and a specific procedure is d veloped which is designed to ensure that reversibility of use can be
achieved with simple administrative means, i.e. means that are available to third world governing
authorities. The essay ends with some concluding observations. 
J.E.L.-code: H20, K32, O10, Q28, 38
Incentive Taxation and Sustainable Growth in the Third World
Introduction
The judicious use of natural resources is a crucial prerequisite for sustainable growth not only in
developed countries, but even more so in the Third World. To a substantial degree, natura
resource use is determined by the tax structure governing a country's economic activity. When
a tax constitution can be designed which stimulates the judicious use of natural resources, an
important step towards achieving sustainable growth has been made. Designing such a constitution
is not a simple task, however. For third world countries, the task i  further complicated by at least
three factors. On the one hand, the tax system has to be exceedingly simple, since both number
and quality of tax instruments available to third world governments tend to be limited. Secondly,
the legal system tends to mirror the state of economic development. This limits not only the tax
structure an economy can bear; it also limits a government's ability to regulate natural resource
use by legal means. Thirdly, the more elaborate a legal system, the more diversity it affords its
country for economic activity, including opportunities for the division of labour. 
In trying to develop a perspective for the design of a tax constitution which allows sustainable
growth in a third world scenario, this essay tries to merge insights from three economic
subdisciplines which tend to be taught separately: public finance, natural resource economics, and
development economics. True to the general theme of this conference, the emphasis will be less
on modern and primarily on classical authors. 
The essay has eight sections in addition to this introduction. It starts with the discussion of the
use of the environment and the natural resource endowment from the point of view of public
finance theory. This point of departure is central, as it serves to identify the net product (le produit
net) of economic activity af er full consideration of the use of natural resources in the process of
production. From this point of view, the question of what constitutes spillover effects or
externalities in a market economy can be seen in the broad public finance perspective developed
in section two. Section three discusses some standard problems in designing a tax constitution for
a third world country. Section four explores possibilities for creating a framework in which the
sustainable use of the natural resource endowment can take place. Central to the sustainable use
is the notion that the environment has to be put to different uses, which raises the issue of the
reversal of use dealt with in section five. The possibilities of ensuring reversibility of the use of
natural resources is discussed in section six and a specific procedure is developed which i signed
to ensure that reversibility of use can be achieved with simple administrative means, i.e. means that
2are available to third world governing authorities. The essay ends with some concluding
observations. 
1
The Use of The Environment in Public Finance Theory:
Establishing the Net Product
One of the central issues on which classical public finance theory has focussed is the correct
establishment of the net product of a national (or for that matter local) economy. The difference
between gross and net social product is the expense necessary to maintain the source of a particular
revenue. Adam Smith states it aptly in chapter II of book II of his Wealth of Nations: "The gross
revenue of allthe inhabitants of a great country comprehends the whole annual produce of their
land and labor; the net revenue, what remains free to them after deducting the expense of
maintaining - first, their fixed, and, secondly, their circulating capital; or what, without encroaching
upon their capital, they can place in their stock reserved for immediate consumption, or spend upon
their subsistence, conveniencies, and amusements. Their real wealth, too, is in proportion, not to
their gross, but to their net revenue." The simple principle has many implic tions. One is that taxes
can only be l vied on (a part of) the net product, if we do not want to risk the availability of the
revenue source altogether. Another is, that to the ex ent natural resources are used in the process
of production, their maintenance has to be ensured as well by deducting the expenses to this end
from the gross revenue of a particular economy. If these expenses for the maintenance of the
endowment with natural resou ces of a country (a state, a city etc.) are not allowed for, changes
in the composition of the capital stock will be taken for net income. The result is that mor  is spent
than earned and the country (state, city, e c.) becomes poorer over time. 
Although the principle is straightforward in its simplicity, its implementation is not. When the use
of the environment occurs in the form of spillovers, it goes by unaccounted for. When implications
of contractual transactions are latent or unforeseeable, they r main likewise unaccounted for. And
when liabilities for damages cannot be attributed, the damages remain where they happen to fall,
causing changes in stocks when they should have caused changes in flows. The damages will take
the form of windfall losses, unrelated to the ec nomic actitivities and decisions which had caused
them. This lack of accountability results in a welfare loss to society as a result of "normal"
economic acitivity which may go largely unnoticed. The nature and extent of this welfare loss will
be discussed in the next section. 
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3What Constitutes Spillover or External Effects?
In classical public finance theory, taxes have the single purpose of providing revenues for essential
governmental expenditures. In modern public finance theory, however, in as much as it follows
the Pigouvian tradition, taxes also serve as instruments to correct for market failures. The
Pigouvian tradition in public finance represents a departure from classical public finance theory
in more than one respect, however. In assigning a regulatory function to the instrument of taxat on,
Pigouvian taxes no longer conform to the canon of taxation. Secondly, the Pigouvian view implies
certain assumptions about the role of governmental authorities in the economic process. The view
constitutes a clear departure from the classical Scottish view of governmental restraint. It
constitutes a departure from the classical continental view as well, which would have relied on
government to correct for market failure either by mans of governmental entrepreneurial activity
or by using legal instruments. Thirdly, the focus on technical spillover effects, while correct in and
by itself, de-emphasizes the question of why the legal order allows for some spillover effects to
remain externalized, while others have to be compensated for and thereby will be in ernalized. This
third aspect has important implications for the problem of designing a tax constitution for a third
world development scenario. 
The presence of externalities by necessity implies a less than judicious use of natural resources.
Negative xternalities signal an overuse of some input, typically a natural resource, relative to
market valuation. In a third world context, when the range of available tax instruments is limited,
the Pigouvian tax/subsidy approach to spillovers is less realistic than in developed economies. It
is therefore sensible to focus on the more traditional approach to handling spillover activities: the
design of a legal system able to cope with such external effects. 
In principle, the market economy is supported by three primary legal institutions: private property,
freedom of contract and liability. These three fundamental institutions end to be hampered in their
ineffectiveness when confronted with environmental spillovers or ext nalities such as 1) latent
or unforeseeable consequences of contractual exchange or 2) ases of multiple causation in which
liability by any one party cannot be established, if the damaging effect occurred only as several
parties acted together without 3) necessarily being able to anticipate the results of this concu rence.
If this constellation is seen as typical for an intractable environmental spillover problem, one might
be led to the conclusion that both the common law and on the European continent the civil law
seem to be out of tune with some of the typical problems posed by the use of the environment.
However, it would be premature to jump to the conclusion that regulative, administrative legal
approaches under these circumstances deserve priority. Throughout the Middle Ages, the prudent
and sustainable use of the environment was ensured by detailed regulation of the technologies that
could be employed. Allthough it is this developed state of technology which creates new
4possibilities for sometimes serious environmental damage, regulating technology use can by itself
cause at least equally serious environmental damage if it stifles the introduction of new
technologies, some of which will burden the environment less than existing ones. Therefore, rather
than emphasizing a shift of legal regimes such as leaving the domain of private law and moving
into regulatory administrative law, or even a Pigouvian tax/subsidy regime requiring even further
informational input, it is desirable to investigate the specific conditions under which a regime of
private law can adequately handle the treble problem outlined above. When spillovers elude the
demarcation of private property rights, when results of contractural transactions are latent or
unforseeable and when causes of damage cannot b  clearly attributed, we face the possibility that
the problem may have become intractable because of its decomposition. This possibility will be
further considered in the next paragraphs. 
In principle, damages will be considered to be correctly assessed if they reflect the harm
demonstrably suffered by an individual or a group of individuals. By necessity, the harm has been
suffered in the past and may continue through the present into the future, while the damages are
assessed retro-actively in order to restitute the victim(s). The rule of liability, although applied
retro-actively, still has effects into the future, to the extent that it is expected to be enforced and
therefore deters harmful activities. The prospective deterrence effect is the weaker; the weaker
is the link between harmful activities and the assessment of damages for compensation. As we
noted in the beginning, in the case of many environmental harms, this link is very weak indeed:
it is weak when spillovers evade the rule of prop rty, when the effects of contractual transactions
are latent or cannot be foreseen, and when multiple causes make it impossible to establish strict
liability. As we take a dynamic perspective, the link becomes even weaker. In principle, a victim
trying to recover damages not only has to prove the extent and cause of the harm, but above all
he must have standing. Standing will in general be restricted to members of a particular jurisdiction
and to presently living victims, typically cutting off trans-jurisdictional and intergenerational
effects. Finally, the harm in general has to be directly suffered. Secondary effects, although not
less important for an individual's net welfare, will not be considered. When due to heavy pollution
the fruits of the garden taste unappealing, this will generally not constitute sufficient harm for a
damage that can be recovered, nor the likely loss in the property value. When asbestos has to be
removed from public buildings, the net public (tax/benefit) burden will have increased, yet a
compensation will not be available. 
The view grounded in the classical public finance tradition explained above yields a completely
different picture. From the point of view of a public economy, be this a local, a state or a national
economy, the overriding concern with a sustainable use of the envir nm nt is the need to keep
natural resources intact for the use of future generations and to compensate for any encroachment
upon the ndowment of natural resources. Explicitly, this principle cannot imply a need to keep
the entire endowment with natural resources in a pristine state. On the contrary: the establishment
See Richard Doll and Richard Peto, The Causes of Cancer, Oxford: Oxford University1
Press, 1981, pp. 12-56.
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and performance of such institutions as the Kuwait Investment Office illustrates the principle: the
extraction and sale of a natural resource (oil) and the re-investment of the proceeds in a widely
spread portfolio of earning assets. If prudently managed, the capital stock of a country, of which
the natural resources ar  a part, thus can be increased in its net present value. A harm is done to
the economy if this stock is encroached upon and the depletion of one part of it is not offset by
the increase in another.
This broader perspective comprises essentially all the spillover effects discussed separat ly in the
standard environmental economics literature, yet it takes a different approach to their
measurement. Instead of trying to establish the technical effects of e.g. asbesto  exposure on cancer
in human males, the public finance approach emphasizes the overall financial impact of all
conceivably damaging factors on the health state of the working population. Instead of following
the chain of causes and effects through from their biological beginning to their financial result, the
procedure is reversed. Starting from the revenue sources of a public economy, the principle is to
keep thes revenue sources intact for the long term. In the example of asbestos, the health state
of the working population is the relevant point of departure, since it is part of the endowment with
factors of production at the disposal of the public economy. The impact of the various factors on
cancer, such as diets, tobacco use, exposure to infections, reproductive and sexual behavior or
exposure to occupational hazards to name some of the most important factors determining the
health state of the working population with respect to cancer - needs to be assessed and measures
have to be designed to keep the revenue source intact. In this particular example, the asbestos
problem will be addressed in the context of other occupational hazards, of which it is a part.
Instead of linking individual asbestos cases with the producers of asbestos, the entire pool of
asbestos cases as part of the entire pool of workers exposed to hazardous materials is linked with
the producers of the hazardous materials. This approach does not always assign environmental
issues highest priority; the particular order given hereindicates that as far as cancer is concerned,1
reasons other than occupational hazards may have to be addressed with higher priority. The
important lesson to be learned from this example is, however, not that environmental issues may
not be important after all. The lesson is rather that the different sources of environmental damages
have to be grouped together in terms of their combined impact on the revenue base of the
particular economy in question, in order to allow for their full assessment. Only once they have
been fully accounted for can policies be design d to prevent the depletion of the resource base of
an economy. 
This principle, again, begs the question of its implementation. Implementation in a third world
context requires special attention to the specific conditions of developmental public finance. This
For a fuller account see Jürgen Backhaus and Richard E. Wagner, "The Cameralist: A2
Public Choice Perspective". Public Choise, 53, 1987, pp. 3-20.
The following is a standard rendition of some of the most important problems i3
developmental finance. A typical treatment can be found in chapter 34 of Richard E.
Musgrave and Peggy B. Musgrave, Public Finance in Theory and Practice. New York,
McGraw-Hill, 1989 (5).
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is the subject of the following section. 
3
Public Finance and Economic Development
Classical public finance as a separate subdiscipline of economics has its roots in the challenge posed
by the disastrous experience of the Thirty Years War in Central Europe. Faced with the urgent
need of developing their devastated and depopulated countries, European statesmen on the
continent turned to their closest advisers, the cameralists, to design state measures in order to
stimulate economic growth. In respo s , a voluminous literature developed and formed the basis
for classical continental public finance theory. Traditionally then, conomic development has been2
a main focus of public finance theory. A main focus of developmental finance is by necessity on3
capital formation. Capital formation has to be understood broadly as including all measures of a
productivity increasing nature. In order to accomplish this task, state authorities have to create
a climate which is conducive to investment. This includes the material infrastructure, but is also
includes the immateri l infrastructure, a predictable and reliable legal order, a clean and efficient
civil service and the assured prospect that investments today will actually pay off in the future.
While these positive incentives for capital formation prvide a substantial agenda for government,
disincentives for consumptions (as the reverse program) are more difficult to handle. On the one
hand, the tax effort of a developing country has to be much smaller than that of a developed
country, since a much larger portion of the disposable income is needed for human reproduction.
Only luxury consumption is conceivably amenable to taxation, although the limits have to be drawn
sharply here as well, since too heavy a tax burden would create a disincentive for investment. In
purely administrative terms, taxation is difficult when taxable entities are small, the activities
unstable and the bookkeeping absent. As a matter of principle, parsimony with respect to tax
instruments is a prerequisite for prudent developmental finance. 
One area of taxation which is fairly insignificant in developed countries stands out as feasible in
developing economies: the taxation of natural resources. In this respect, however, care has to be
taken. There is general agreement in the literature that with respect to land taxation, he instrument
See also Musgrave & Musgrave, p. 599.4
Progress and Poverty was first published by D. Appleton & Co. in New York in January,5
1880. However, in his preface, George refers to the November 1890 dition already as the
fourth. His account of the editorial history is as follows: "This work was written between
August, 1877, and March, 1879and the plates finished by September of that year. Since
that time, new illustrations have been given of the correctness of the views herein indicated
[...]. But there has been nothing in the criticisms they have received to induce the change
or modification of these views - in fact, I have yet to see an objection not answered i
advance in the book itself. And except that some verbal errors have been corrected and
a preface added, this edition is the same as previous ones." (1979: p. xxx).
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has to be handled prudently. The Musgraves write: "Effective land taxation is difficult when food
is home consumed, the agricultural sector is largely nonmonetised, and land surveys are inadeq at
in providing proper valuations (page 595)". In addition, land taxes, as every other form of taxation,
in order to be effective, have to be lvied in line with received customs and convictions prevalent
in that particular society. On the whole, there seems to be a consensus in the literature that with
respect to land taxation, potential rather than actual income from land should be subject to
taxation. Obviously and in line with the preceeding analysis, only the potential net product of land4
can be subject to taxation. Furthermore the term "land" should be regarded as a shorthand for all
natural resources available for production. 
On the basis of this short summary of principles of developmental finance on the background of
received principles of classical public finance, we may now turn to the issue of creating a
framework for the sustainable use of the environment. 
4
Creating a Framework for the Sustainable Use
of the Environment
In doing so, another short digression into the history of economic thought is necessary, since such
a framework has originally been proposed by Henry George.
Henry George (1839-97) was a self-taught American economist and  political writer whose name
is commonly associated with the  notion of a Single Tax on land. George had worked as a sailor,
printer and newspaperman when he became fascinated with the rapid  and uneven development
of California and began to probe the  economic causes determining the price of land. This
investigation  he undertook in order to solve "the great eni m  of our times", which he held to
be "the association of poverty with progress" (1979, p. 10). His insights he systematically
developed in his  Progress and Poverty, first published in 1879. The book began to receive wider5
A twenty-fifth anniversary edition with a preface by Henry George jr. was published in
1905. The son explains that the publisher had insisted on George bearing the cost of
making the plates, which George did in the shop of a friend in San Francisco. There, "an
'Author's Proof Edition' of five hundred copies was struck off" (1979: p. xxiii). A centenary
edition prefaced by his grandaughter, Agnes George de Mille, appeared in 1979 in New
York, published by the Robert Schalkenbach Foundation. This 1979 edition contains the
aforementioned prefaces as well as an extensive index and a glossary of terms. 
In conclusion, the first edition was San Francisco 1879, the first published edition New
York 1880, and the final authorized edition with any changes New York 1890 (4). 
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attention in Britain in connection with the Irish  question and later made George fa ous in his own
country, too. He spent the last part of his life as a public speaker at home and abroad, and it was
George himself who made the Singl Tax  proposal a political issue in his (unsuccessful) bids for
the  mayoralty of New York first in 1886 and again in 1897. 
His place in the history of ec nomic analysis is aptly  sketched by Joseph Alois Schumpeter who
writes: 
The points about him that are relevant for a history of analysis are these. He was a
self-taught economist, but he was an economist. He acquired most of the knowledge and
of the ability to handle an economic argument that he could have acquired by academic
training as it then was. In that he differed to his advantage from most men who proffered
panaceas. Barring his panacea (the Single Tax) and the phraseology connected with it, he
was a very orthodox economist and extremely conservative as to methods. They were
those of the English 'classics', A. Smith being his particular favourite. [...] Even the panacea
- nationalization not of land but of the rent of land by a co fiscatory tax - benefitted by
his competence as an economist, for he was careful to frame his 'remedy' in such a manner
as to cause the minimum injury to the efficiency of the private-enterprise economy. [...]
The proposal itself [...] is not economically unsound, except in that it involves an unwarran-
ted optimism concerning the yield of such a tax. In any case, it should not be put down
as nonsense. If Ricardo's vision of economic development had been correct, it would even
have been obvious wisdom (1954, p. 865).
Schumpet r was correct in characterizing George's economic methods as conventional. Yet
Progress and Poverty is not mainly a work f economic analysis, but a decidedly unorthodox and
non-conservative social reformer's treatise. The book was written in order to provide the answer
to a  practical question of economic policy: How can we design an institutional order in which
economic progress goes hand in hand with a reduction of poverty? This sounds almost like a
paraphrase of the problem posed in the title of this essay. Schumpeter, like many other critics of
9George, probably was incorrect in casually dismissing George's assertion about the practical
possibilities of George's tax constitution from the standpoint of revenue yield. George may very
well have been justified in his optimistic estimate of the yield of his Single Tax. This tax is a far
cry from the real estate taxes  a superficial reader may associate with the term "tax on land".
Rather, as I try to explain on the following pages, George presents us with a comprehensive
package of an environmental tax reform which, politically, has teeth. The program is, in fact, a
tax constitution so c mprehensive and far-reaching that no  attribute could be more misleading
than the term "conservative". 
As this author reads Progress and Poverty, George comes across as a scholar in the best tradition
of political economy. His analysis is motivated by  clearly defined social policy problem. George
analyzes a problem in order to solve it. He succeded in designing a solution - his "remedy" - which
relies on an institutional reform, i.e. George understood the interdependence between economic
processes and the institutional order in which they take place. Finally, George went about his
analysis in what today would be described as an inter-  disciplinary approach, i.e. the questions
he would consider were forced upon him by the subject matter under consideration and not by
some disciplinary boundaries as they mig t have developed over time. When, e.g.  looks at the
effects of his "remedy", he takes them up in this order: effects on (1) production, (2) distribution,
(3) individuals and classes, and (4) social organization and social life (1979, IX). 
The shortest book in Progress and Poverty, and at the same time the most important, is book VI
in which George spells out his program. The central chapter, entitled "The True Remedy" barely
covers two printed pages, and the solution itself is stated in ju t one sentence: "We must make
land common property" (1979, p. 328). 
The explosive potential of his program is wrapped into this  rather innocuous sentence. The true
extent of the proposal can be  discerne  by looking at the implementation rule and his concept of
land. The implementation rule is stated in equally concise terms: "It is not necessary to confiscate
land, it is only necessary to confiscate rent" (1979, p. 405). Finally, there is an underlying principle
also worth reporting: "What is necessary for the use of land is not its private ownership, but the
security of improvements" (1979, p. 398). This quote also points to Henry George's differentiation
between improved and unimproved natural resources and the idea of the unearned improvement.
The unearned improvement today turns out to be a hindrance to improvements tomorrow, since
the possibility of gaining unearned improvements diverts energies from the very process of
improving upon natural resources. In contemporary language, one might say that George tried
to prevent wasteful rent-seeking activities by insisting on the principle that the benefits from
improvements should accrue to whoever made the improvements, whereas unclaimabl
externalities belong to the common domain. 
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The purpose of the entire reform program, according to this  principle, is to encourage the use
of land by designing a structure of property rights which allows individuals to reap the  benefits
of their labor, viz. the 'improvements' without barring  the use of common property resources by
others. His definition of 'land , as spelled out in a chapter appropriately entitled "The Meaning of
the Terms" (1979, p. I 2) is not confined t the surface of the earth. His is an analytical definition
based on the concept of factrs of production. There are in George's model two  original factors
of production, called 'labor' and 'land'. 'Capital' is a secondary or derived factor of production,
comprising only things "which have resulted from the union of these two original factors of
production" (1979, p. 39). Since 'labor' is defined in a mor  standard way as "all human exertion",
including, by the way, 'human capital', because "human powers, whether natural or acquired can
never be classed as capital" (1979, p. 39); this leaves land as the all encompassing category f tho e
original means of production which are not labor. In short, 'land' stands for the endowment of
natural resources. 
Characteristically, George defines land both analytically and by giving a sequence of examples
illustrating the basic, comprehensive concept:
"The term land necessarily includes, not merely the surface of the earth as distinguished
from the water andthe air, but the whole material universe outside of man himself, for it
is only by having access to land, from which his very body is drawn, that man can come
in contact with or use nature. The term land embraces, in short, all natural materials, forces,
and opportunities, and, therefore, nothing that is freely supplied by nature can be properly
classed as capital. A fertile field, a rich vein of ore, a falling stream which supplies power,
may give to the possessor advant ges equivalent to the possession of capital, but to class
such things as capital would be to put an end to the distinction between land and capital,
and, so far as they relate to each other, to mak  the two terms meaningless" (1979, p. 38-
39).
It is obvious that, commensurate with technical progress, the window of opportunities granted
by nature is pushed ever more open, and in this way the Georgian term 'land' assumes an ever more
encompassing meaning. Simultaneously, the tax base of the State entrusted with the power of the
Single Tax on the rent of natural resources is also broadening in pace with technical progress.
While George defines 'land' in exactly the same way as w define natural resources today, George
differs from most present-day proponents of environmental tax reform by wishing to encourage
the prudent use of natural resources, whereas the standard approach today is to design schemes
seeking restriction of such use. 
The twin objective to open access to the use of all opportunities provided by the natural
environment while, at the same time, granting full security of all improvements made upon the
For a modern statement see Eirik G. Furubotn, 1979.6
A reader has pointed to the difficulty of measuring what part of the "unearned" increment7
is due to nature, what part due to society, and what part due to entrepreneurship or effort.
Dr. Krabbe and I have dealt with this issue elsewhere and at length. (See Backhaus and
Krabbe, 1990). 
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resource as found in the state of nature requires a partitioning of property rights along this
distinction. This partitioning must have struck many of George's contemporaries as unusual or6
artificial. But, as he tries to show in his long survey of "Prop rty in Land Historically Considered"
(1979, VII 4), the partitioning should not be considered that unusual after  all. You don't saw a
ship in half if it is owned by two men, is his common sense comment.7
        
The partitioning of property rights is effected through the instruments provided by the m dern
tax state. Owners retain their property titles, but these titles are re-interpreted as designating the
accumulated improvements, while the entire land rent remains in the common property of the state.
The tax state, in this way, becomes a partner in the development of the land (country), a residual
claimant of all the external benefits not appropriated by the individual owners. 
Since this point is very important for understanding the dynamics of the Georgian scheme, let us
look at his own statement:
Every productive enterprise, besides its returns to those who undertake it, yields collateral
advantages to others. If a man plant[s] a fruit tree, his gain is that he gathers the fruit in
its time and season. But in addition to his gain, there is a gain to the whole community.
Others than the owner are benefitted by the increased supply of fruit; the birds which it
shelters by far and wide; the rain which it helps to attract falls not alone on his field; and,
even to the eye which rests upon it from a distance, it brings a sense of beauty (1979, p.
435).
Assigning the unappropriable positive externalities of production to the State implies that George's
concept of common property in natural resources actually goes beyond the original state of nature.
It likewise includes the accumulated externalities or, put in more accessible terms, the cultural
heritage of a country, its vegetation, climate, architecture and landscape, etc.. A , by virtue of
the tax scheme, this cultural heritage also forms the tax base which the state is expected to foster.
"Nature laughs at a miser" (1979, p. 436), Henry George tells us in characteristic prose, and he
certainly laughs at too parsimonious a use of the natural endowment. Not only is the tax scheme
designed to minimize disincentives (1979; IX 1); stronger still, it co-erces people into eithr making
productive use of the resources they possess or else relinquish them: "If land were taxed to
This attribute might surprise the American reader. Yet, before coming to the United States,8
Schumpeter had distinguished himself in public finance. Schumpeter not only served as
the first Secretary of the Treasury in the Austrian Republic precisely because he was
considered a public finance expert; in this capacity he drafted a stabilization plan which
could not come to fruition for reasons unrelated to the budget. He also held the chairs in
public finance at the universities of Graz and Bonn. He did not receive a chair at the
University of Berlin to which he had aspired, because the faculty felt that the did not need
another public finance expert (next to Popitz). 
This modern language should not lead the reader to suspect that the single tax might be9
without problems. It is conceivable that the single tax might not be Pareto optimal, notably
because of effects on the timing of development. But one should keep in min that George
was making a contribution to econ mic policy, and not to the theory of optimal taxation.
Even in the case of suboptimality just mentioned, o e has to keep in mind that these cases
require resort to second best analysis, and that it is by no means inconceivable that the lest
distorting tax regime in the world of second best remains the single tax. 
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anything near its rental value, no one could afford to hold land that he was not using" (1979, p.
413). 
This growth oriented fiscal constitution, however, has a clever check on publi  sect r growth built
into it. It is here where the seemingly ideological and often misunderstood insistence on the Singl
Tax assumes importance. This feature of the Georgian proposal has always bewildered so many
commentators, including the public finance expert Schumpeter. The explanation lies in th8
systematic unity of George's proposal. George suggested a tax constitution wich defines incentives
faced by the tax collecting authorities. George wanted to foster progress by using the power to
tax in a very specific way, but he was also suspicious of government bureaucracies (1979, p. VIII
3). By  designating a broad tax base but limiting the power to tax to just one tax, the up to 100%
tax on the rent of natural resources, he hoped to find the proper balance. On the one hand, the
Georgian tax constitution creates incentives for those in public office to support equitable
economic development, which flushes ever increasing tax revenues into public coffers. The State
can grow unimpeded by any pre-conceived restrictions, as long as this public sector growth is
financed from theincreasing rental value of natural resources. On the other hand, as soon as the
value of these rents stagnates or even declines, the state  has to curtail its own expenditures. By
virtue of the Single Tax  constitution, the State is harnessed into prudent, long term natural9
resource use, just as the private sector is co-erced into attaining the production possibility frontier.
Built into George's reform is a 'tax constitution for Leviathan', to use Buchanan's term, a public
choice approach avant-la-lettre. In one respect, however, George's tax constitution is different from
the typical Leviathan tax constitutions which we owe to the modern public choice school. The
limits on the size of the state budget are not predetermined, bu  determined according to the tasks
the state may face. For instance, as natural resource use creates negative externalities, to the same
extent increases the claim of the state on financial resources to mitigate these effects. On the other
The following paragrpahs are not literally grounded in Henry George's Progress and10
Poverty; they rather follow directly from his definition of land as including all natural
resources and his definition of improvements. But he did not himself spell out these
implications, nor did he spell out details of the requisite implementation rule. 
For the United States, one can start thinking about such procedures by looking at the11
reclamation of land used for surface strip mining. See US Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act of 1977, (P.L. 95-87). This law calls for bonding and specifies landscape
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hand, if nature is left in a pristine state, the state's claim on financial resources is very limited
indeed; but so are the state's tasks in such an economy.
Even more surprisingly, this growth-oriented tax constitution  clearly deserves the label
"environmental" due to its built-in dynamic structure. By an "environmental" or "ecological" tax
scheme one understands a fiscal constitution which induces economic agents to make optimal use
of the environmental resources, neith r squandering nor oversparing them. This is precisely what
the Georgian system is designed to accomplish. The clue to the conservational feature of the
Georgian tax constitution, again, lies in the partitioning of property into (internalizable)
improvements (private ownership) and the rent of the resource as such (public ownership). The
size of this rent is a positive function of the state of economic development of the surrou ding
economy and a negative function of the exhaustion of the natural resource. 
Obviously, the rent on resource use is paid exclusively for the use of the natural endowment and10
not for its abuse. Depletion of a natural resource requires an additional compensation owed to the
community which, in the Georgian model, is represented by the Tax State. The State is thereby
entitled to two streams of revenues, viz. the rent collected from the use of its natural resources
and, more generally, the environment; and the compensations for the abuse of those resources.
Clearly, George was not a strict conservationist in the sense of sparing nature from any form of
depletion. He wanted the ore to be mined and not to be left in the ground (1979, p. 38). Yet, at
the same time, he wanted the community to extract a fair compensation for this impairment. While
the guarantee of improvements is the core of the State guarantee of private property rights,
impairments of cmmon property resources require a compensation. The State thereby can plan
the inter-temporal use of the natural resource endowment in the interest of overall fiscal concerns.
We can conclude that George is fully in line with the classical principle of conserving the value
of the natural resource endowment spelled out above.
The operational coherence and onclusivity of the abuse correction mechanism, of course, needs
to be spelled out in institutional detail. Much will depend on the particular tax administration a
country has set up. Such an administration would have to be backed by a system of tax courts in
such matters as when judgement is required as to when an action constitutes an abuse or not.11
contours, vegetation, etc. For Germany, an actionable procedure has been described i
Jürgen Backhaus, 1988.
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Yet the principle is simple enough to be of use even in the third world case of minimal
administrative facilities. 
5
Reversal of Use
This inter-temporal dimension embedded into Henry Ge rg 's tax constitution assumes additional
importance when we consider the change or reversal of uses environmental resources may be put
to. Keeping the door to change and, notably, changes in resource use wide open is vital for
preventing the rise and persistence of monopolies, including the state monopolies characteristic
of many third world countries. The Georgian scheme, of course, requires that every resource be
put to its most productive use. Again, the dynamic adjustment process is carefully conceived. The
most productive use determines the rent of the resource, irrespective of whether the owner
operates at the production possibility frontier or not. The automatic adjustment of rents, as a
consequence of technical progress, constantly pushes economic agents to make the most judicious
use of environmental resources. This implies that the Georgian system actually encourages the
reversal and change of production methods involving natural resources. Unlike the present system
of private property in land (1979, ch. VII 5), the scheme does not favor the first user at all, since
a more valuable use makes it too expensive to continue the first use. The opportunity costs of
natural resource use, by virtue of the land rent tax, enter into the present user's cost function.
Reversal of use can be more vexing a problem if natural resources are irretrievably devoted to some
production (or consumption) process. The safeguard provided by the Georgian system is not a
perfect one, since George opposed the conservati  of natural resources for their own sake. Yet,
George provided for two checks. The irreversable use of an environmental resource is checked
on the one hand by the compensation payment required for abuse. The amount of this payment,
in turn, will increase with the introduction of competing, more valuable uses  as a consequence
of technical progress. The second check lies in the communal nature of environmental resources.
Since the environment is in the common property i.e. State domain, a political decision can
override private commercial concerns. The political decision will be informed, above all, by the
revenue consequences for the Single Tax State, a State which George has placed in the position
of guardian of the environment in order to ensure its own fiscal survival.
Having explored George's tax constitution, we can finally integrate his contribution into the
solution to our question.
This insight is by no means original with me. See Sidney and Beatrice Webb, Constitution12
for the Socialist Commonwealth of Great Britain, Londo , 1920.
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6
Ensuring Reversal of Use
for Sustainable Development
Ensuring reversability of resource use is again above all a matter of constitutional design. A
political institution has to be found which is closely associat d with the particular natural resource
in question. Very often, the political boundaries co-incide poorly with natural environments. The
case of the pollution of the river Rhine, the North Sea or the Baltic Sea point to vivid examples.
But the same case of the Rhine also points to viable legal solutions. Since 1919, shipping on the
Rhine is an international affair. The Rhine flows through the Lake of Constance, which is a
condominium or jointly held property of Austria, Switzerland, and the two German states of
Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg. However, both the Rhine and the Lake of Constance still lack
their own legal identity which would make it possible to make a prudent and sustainable use of
the natural resource in question. As we move down from the international to national and local
jurisdictions, the problem becomes less and less intricate. A particular city, e.g., h s its clearly
circumscribed original endowment of resources of which its inhabitants and its politicians tend to
be quite aware. The country we are currently meeting in, Iran, underscores the extent to which
pristine wilderness made accessible is part of the natural resource endowment, as is the
architectural nd cultural heritage as part of the natural resource endowment we are presently
confronted with, which implies that the ancient architectural treasures have to be counted as
belonging to the capital stock which to maintain is the purpose of the entire Georgian proposal.
The first step in constitutional design then is to identify the correct political jurisdiction to which
a particular natural or cultural resource belongs. This i  done by making an inventory of the12
natural resources and their use in a particul r country, state or city, and in cases of dispute assign
the rights of use accordingly to the different public bodies in question. The licence to operate a
business next to a Nation l Park obviously carries a different rental value from one to operate in
a more prosaic environment. Once the inventory has been arrived at and the uses established, the
third step is to estimate the benefit levels associated with the uses acruing to the public authority
in question. In the original Georgian proposal, these benefits are handled in terms of tax revenues
exclusively. In terms of post-Keynesian public finance, this would be an unrealistic approach. Even
local governments, and much more so state and federal or national governments have more than
revenue seeking objectives. In the simplest of cases, we can postulate that governments will be
interested in revenues and jobs. Very often, one translates into the other, at least in the mind of
the treasurer who knows how much is needed in subsidies in order to attract additional
A recent example mayillustate the point. According to the Wall Street Journal's Asra Q.13
Nomani, Minnesota Gov. Arne Carlson signed a bill that gives NWA Inc.'s Northwest
Airlines $740 million in financi l assistance, including $320 million of direct loans for the
carrier's operations. In addition, Minnesota lawmakers voted an estimated $40 million in
tax incentives to entice Northwet to build two maintenance facilities in the state, expected
to employ 2,000 new workers. $320 million of direct loans (part of the $740 million
financial assistance package) will be used to accelerate options on new jets made by Airbus
Industrie, a European consortium. (The Wall Street Journal Europe, Monday June 3, 1991,
p. 4.) By implication, the state of Minnesota values an additional maintenance job at the
facility at $2o,000 in direct tax incentives and an additional $370,000 in financial
assistance. The second figure also reflects the state's desire to prevent the loss of jobs in
the state that might occur if Northwest Airlines had to follow the example of Eastern
Airlines. Such assistance packages are by no means unique to the state of Minnesota. 
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employment. These objectives have to be combined into a particular index, which can be a given13
sum expressing e.g. units of employment equivalents in monetary terms. The intensity of
environmental use is then correlated with the current performance of the user of the environmental
resource in terms of this monetary equivalent. We can, e.g., determine how many employment
equivalents a business next to a National Park or a romantic bridge over the river Moldau
mentioned above generates. Each resource use next to this location has to be assessed such a
monetary equivalent. This is the rent to be collected from the resource user. If a business with
heavy resource use generates comparatively low revenues or comparatively little employment,
there is a strong incentive for it to move to a less desirable location and give way to a mor
productive resource use in terms of the policy objectives expressed in the monetary equivalents.
This system creates dynamic pressure by itself; yet the tax instrument can be combined with the
typical licensing instrument used in traditional environmental regulation by again assigning
monetary equivalents to the exercise of a license granted. In order to avoid grandfathering of
resource use which typically is at the source of environmental waste, the successful new applicant
has to prove that his intended resource use will yield a higher number of monetary equivalents han
the present resource use. If the new licence is to be granted, the current licence holder has to be
given adequate notice that the licence will be revoked unless he can improve his own performance
up to the standard of the new intended use. At this juncture, there is an important role for either
a developmental agency or an insurance company to play. 
The authorities of any country or city, but even more so the authorities of a third world country
or city face enormous difficulties in assessing the reliability and trustworthiness of different
applicants. A country or city revoking one licence in order to grant it to another user, for reasons
of credibility and for reasons of sound fiscal budgeting has to be assured that the new licence will
actually produce a higher yield than the old one. Therefore, one viable strategy might be to insist
that a bid for relicencing can only be successful if the performance of the applicant has been insured
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for the duration of the licence applied for by either a private insurance company or some publicly
backed developmental agency. Preventing imprudent or uncareful use of environmental resources
by way of this procedure becom s a prime objective of the insurance company or developmental
agency involved in writing insurance for these applications. 
The infinitely more complicated issue of use reversal, again, cannot be handled without introducing
an insurance solution. A basic distinction has to be made between current uses of the environment
and new applications for environmental resource use. Current uses have to be dealt with in terms
of creating the pre-conditions necessary for the reversal of use over a period of time. New
applications can be dealt with in stricter terms. After a period of transition from one regime to the
other, both forms of resource use, traditional and new ones have to be treated on an equal basis
in order to avoid undue grandfathering. Again, international developmental agencies or insurance
companies can play an important role. 
7
Sketch of a Procedure
New applications are relatively simpler than the continuation of old uses. Consider the apllication
for establishing an airport. In terms of the scheme outlin d above, the application will indicate the
number of monetary job equivalents expected to be generated by the airport. A certain amount
of land will have to be claimed, and if for converting it to the airport use it need be covered with
concrete; original natural environments will thereby be destroyed. The application also states the
expected costs of reconverting the airport to its original s ate, with the cost estimates being based
on bids by qualified bidders to carry out the work. T e bids have to be insured or guaranteed and
are thereby rendered qualified. The insurer or guarantor thereby assumes responsibility for the
accuracy of the bids. The application further icludes notice of insurance of the proposed number
of monetary job equivalents effective upon granting the licence. This insurance policy covers the
revenue base for the jurisdiction in charge of issuing the licence. Should the airport venture fail
to generate the expected benefit in either revenues or employment opportunities, reversal of use
is ensured and can be carried out after the proper notice has been given.
As far as traditional uses are concerned, the difficulty is to establish to what state the used natural
resources would have to b  reverted. That state of nature has to be described in a proper zoning
decision, whereupon granting of the licence can be effected in the same way as described
beforehand, involving again two insurance contracts. The basic rationale of this procedure is not
dissimilar to current American practice. The novel aspect consists in the heavy use of insurance
or guaranteeing relationships in order to contain the risk of damaging the environment by making
improper licencing decisions. The ustainable use of environmental resources is made difficult by
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the presence of risk and uncertainty about the consequences of decisions separately but
simultaneously taken by different actors. Without amendment, the private law system based on
private property, freedom of contract and individual liability cannot effectively deal with
environmental spillovers, latent or unpredictable consequences of contractual exchange and high
transactions costs in attributing causes to effects, in particular if multiple causes bring about effects
only when individual actors take their decisions separately but simultaneously. 
8
Conclusion
There is a widespread tendency to move to regulatory regimes in order to alleviate these problems.
Yet regulatory regimes by themselves do not have a better track record in containing environmental
waste. The present paper explores the extent to which environmental damages can be insured,
thereby creating prospective incentives in addition to the retro-active incentives present in the
regime of private property. A procedure is outlined which, derived from classical principles of
public finance, combines taxing and licencing decisions with insured bids on the strength of which
decisions can be taken by necessarily underinformed public authorities.
The solution is meant to respond to the special needs of developing countries. The solution
requires only a simple administrative infrastructure, and it allows international developmental
agencies and large multinational corporations to play a role in the implementation. Natural
resoursec are emphasized as the single most taxable assets of developing countries, and a tax
constitution built on simple principles of classical public finance is described. This constitution is
a selfinforcing one in stimulating sustainable growth through incentive taxation.
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